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It has been argued (Thompson, Prowse Turner & Pennycook, 2011) that the experience of ease 
(i.e., the ability to quickly generate an initial response) during processing influences one’s 
likelihood of engaging reflectively with a problem. Thompson and colleagues argued that the 
ease with which an answer comes to mind (i.e., answer fluency) is a critical determinant of 
Feelings of Rightness (FOR), which, in turn, determine one’s likelihood of reflecting. However, 
the possibility remained that the critical determinant of FORs is the speed of the total response, 
given the nature of the evidence for this claim. The critical difference between these two 
accounts is the contribution of factors occurring after the point where an answer comes to mind. 
Across two Experiments, we manipulated the duration of the physical response in order to 
identify whether participants’ confidence (FOR) judgments are at least partially based on factors 
occurring after the initial mental generation of an answer. We found no evidence that FORs nor 
reflection are influenced by a manipulation of response execution. Broadly, the present 
investigation provides evidence that the relation between speed of response and FORs is likely 
due to the speed with which an answer is generated internally. That is, events occurring after the 
generation of a response, at least as operationalized here, do not influence FORs. This is 
consistent with Thompson and colleagues’ (2011) suggestion that answer fluency is the critical 
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Dual-Process theories of reasoning suggest that, when making decisions, individuals 
produce two qualitatively distinct types of response. Type I responses are quick, and based on 
intuitive, heuristic processes, and sometimes individuals override these responses with a slower, 
reflective, deliberative, Type II response (de Neys, 2006; Evans, 2003, 2007, 2008; Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013). Though the common conceptualization of Type I processes as ‘always bad’ 
and Type II processes as ‘always good’ is fallacious (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; see Evans, 2007 
for examples), Type II reasoning is thought to be necessary to engage in cognitive decoupling 
(i.e., abstracting the problem so as to reduce influence from real-world beliefs; Stanovich, 2011, 
2012). Cognitive decoupling, in turn, is necessary to solve many of the abstract, representational 
problems studied in the reasoning domain (Evans, 2010). As such, much attention has been given 
to the characteristics of problems (e.g., Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2012; De Neys & 
Glumicic, 2008), and those who are solving them (e.g., Frederick, 2005; Littrell, Fugelsang, & 
Risko, 2019; Pennycook & Rand, 2019) that are associated with an increased tendency for Type 
II reasoning to be engaged.  
Thompson, Prowse Turner, and Pennycook (2011) argued that, in addition to 
characteristics of problems and problem-solvers, characteristics of the reasoning process itself 
can drive the ultimate decision to reflect. Specifically, the experience of ease (i.e., the ability to 
quickly generate a response) during Type I processing is held to influence one’s likelihood of 
engaging Type II processing. That is, Type I outputs that are generated easily will be associated 
with less reflection, and Type I outputs that are difficult to generate with more reflection. This 
framework for understanding Type II engagement is referred to as Metacognitive Reasoning 
Theory (MRT). Thompson and colleagues provided evidence for the core claim of this account 
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using a two-response paradigm, wherein participants were initially required to assess the 
logicality of a syllogism, but did so under instruction to answer quickly, with the first response 
that came to mind. This was done to reduce the likelihood that the initial response was 
influenced by Type II processes. After the initial response, participants gave a Feeling-of-
Rightness (FOR) judgment about how likely they thought it was that they initially generated the 
correct response. Participants then responded to the syllogism again, but this time were given 
unlimited time to try to generate the correct answer. Thompson and colleagues observed higher 
FORs for initial responses that were generated quickly, suggesting that responses accompanied 
by a feeling of ease are associated with greater confidence. Additionally, trials with greater FORs 
were associated with a decreased tendency to engage Type II processes, and as such they argued 
that the ultimate decision to reflect is at least partially driven by the ease, or fluency, experienced 
when generating a Type I response.  
What is Fluency? 
Cognitive processes vary in terms of the effort they require to complete. It has been 
argued that processes requiring little effort are accompanied by a generalized feeling of ease or 
goodness (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009), which has been suggested to influence various 
judgments about a task, including confidence (Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007; 
Hertzog, Dunlosky, Robinson, & Kidder, 2003; Simmons & Nelson, 2006). Processing fluency is 
the broad name given to this subjective feeling of ease or goodness, and considerable work has 
gone into determining aspects of a task that are responsible for this experience (for a review, see 
Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009). Similarly, much work has gone into studying the consequences of 
subjectively experiencing fluency. Indeed, effects of facilitating or disrupting processing on 
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confidence or other metacognitive judgments are relatively well-documented (e.g., Castel, 
McCabe, Roediger, 2007; Koriat, 1993; Simmons & Nelson, 2006).  
Understanding what aspects of processing influence FORs is central to better 
understanding the tendency to reflect. In Thompson and colleagues’ (2011) work, FORs were 
argued to arise from what they referred to as answer fluency. Answer fluency refers to the ease 
with which an individual can generate an answer; that is, answers that come to mind more easily 
are higher in answer fluency.  This idea leaves out of the fluency experience, or at least the one 
influencing FORs, processes or events that occur after the generation of the answer (e.g., the 
execution of a response). In the present investigation we examine the potential influence of the 
latter on FORs and reflection. 
The idea that the fluency experience might be affected by different stages of processing 
has been explored outside the reasoning context. Reber, Wurtz, and Zimmermann (2004) 
demonstrated in a word-identification task that both figure-ground contrast and font influence 
subjective judgments about fluency, despite hindering the perception of stimuli at different 
stages of processing. Though low figure-ground contrast hindered only the detection of stimuli 
and not their identification, and disfluent font hindered only the identification of stimuli and not 
their detection, both independently reduced subjective fluency judgments. This finding provided 
evidence that: 1) individuals are sensitive to the experience of ease at multiple stages of 
processing, and 2) that subjective judgments about ease are influenced by these experiences at 
different stages of processing. 
The idea that post-answer processes/events might influence the experience of ease or 
difficulty also draws support from extant work in other domains. For example, Susser and 
Mulligan (2015; also Susser, Panitz, Buchin, & Mulligan, 2017) required participants in a 
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memory task to respond to each word in a list by writing it down. This was done either with 
one’s dominant or non-dominant hand. Writing words with one’s non-dominant hand produced 
decreased Judgments of Learning (JOLs) for those words, despite showing no detriment in recall. 
This finding suggests that elements of one’s response to a stimulus can act as a cue from which 
to make metacognitive judgments about the processing of that stimulus. Put another way, the 
actual physical execution of a response factors into a subjective feeling of difficulty.  
In a similar vein, Undorf and Erdfelder (2011) provided evidence that individuals use 
time, in and of itself, as a metacognitive cue. In their studies, participants were asked to provide 
JOLs for another participant. However, in one condition, the only information participants had 
by which to make this judgment was the duration of the yoked participant’s self-paced study of 
the items. Perhaps unsurprisingly, participants provided greater JOLs for short study periods, 
presumably inferring ease on the part of the participant to whom they were yoked. However, 
even when they had access to the items themselves (and thus, presumably, their difficulty), short 
study periods were still given greater JOLs than longer study periods. That is, participants use 
time per se as a metacognitive cue, even in the light of access to subjective difficulty 
information. Combining the results of Undorf and Erdfelder (2011) with those of Susser and 
Mulligan (2015; Susser et al., 2017), one can posit that 1) individuals infer ease or difficulty 
from the amount of time elapsed in a given task, and 2) elapsed time includes processes up until 
the completion of a response. Thus, it is possible that post-answer processes/events might 
influence FORs by virtue of the fact that they necessarily affect the time required to complete a 
response.  
While the view that the relation between speed and FORs is a result of answer fluency is 
consistent with the data Thompson and colleagues reported, the nature of the evidence (i.e., a 
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correlation between RT and FOR), of course, leaves open the possibility of post-answer 
processes or events influencing one’s FOR. This is because an individual’s Response Time, what 
Thompson and colleagues used as an index of answer fluency, necessarily includes both pre- and 
post-answer processes. Thus, it is entirely possible that what predicts FORs is not the speed that 
an answer comes to mind, but rather the speed with which a response is completed which would 




















In Experiment 1, we manipulated the duration of the physical response in order to 
identify whether participants’ confidence (FOR) judgments are at least partially based on factors 
occurring after the initial mental generation of an answer. We utilized the two-response paradigm 
introduced by Thompson and colleagues (2011), but with the important difference that the 
execution of participants’ responses was slowed on half of trials. If it is true that participants 
evaluate their outputs in terms of ease or speed at the moment an answer is generated, then any 
manipulation beyond that point will have no effect on FORs nor reflection. If, however, 
participants evaluate Type I outputs based on the total time it takes to respond, a delay of said 
response might produce effects on FORs and reflection similar to outputs that are difficult to 
generate. That is, slower responses should feel less right.  
Method 
 Participants. Forty undergraduate students from the University of Waterloo participated 
in exchange for partial course credit. This sample size was pre-registered and based on an a 
priori power analysis and gave us 80% power to detect a medium-sized effect equivalent to d = 
.45 with a two-tailed, paired-samples t-test. This effect size was based on a previous version of 
the experiment, but it has since been determined that the results of said experiment were due to a 
methodological artifact conceptually unrelated to the present investigation. As such, the prior 
experiment and any comparisons with present experiment are not reported. 
 Design. There was only one independent variable, which had two levels (Condition: Fast 
vs. Slow). Each condition had its own block, which were counterbalanced across participants. 
The key dependent variables of interest were FORs, Response Initiation Time (time to begin a 
response to the first iteration of each syllogism by moving the mouse toward one of the choices; 
 7 
used instead of actual response time because response time necessarily includes our manipulation 
on half of trials), Rethinking Time (time to respond to the second iteration of each problem), and 
Answer Change (whether the response to the second iteration of the problem differed from that 
of the first iteration). 
 Stimuli and Apparatus. Stimulus presentation and response recording was controlled by 
MATLAB 2014b using Psychophysics Toolbox 3.0.12 (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner, Brainard, & 
Pelli, 2007). The stimuli consisted of 48 individual syllogisms, which varied systematically in 
terms of their type (categorical vs. conditional), validity, and believability of their premises and 
conclusions. Syllogisms were assigned randomly to Condition. Participants selected their 
response to each syllogism using the mouse. 
 Procedure. On each trial, participants were required to respond to the stimulus twice. 
Each time they responded, they were required to select “yes” if the provided conclusion followed 
logically from the premises, and “no” if the provided conclusion did not follow logically from 
the premises. On the first iteration, it was emphasized that they respond as fast as possible, and 
on the second, it was emphasized that they take as long as they need to get the correct answer. 
After the first iteration, but before the second iteration, participants indicated on a seven-point 
scale how likely they thought it was that their initial response was correct (their FOR). Before 
each individual response, the mouse reset to the vertical and horizontal centre of the screen. 
Response options were equidistant (~450 pixels) to the right and left of the horizontal centre of 
the screen, but centred vertically. In one block of trials, the mouse was slowed during the first, 
speeded response. This increased the duration of response by approximately three seconds, 
which also resulted in an overall increase in Response Time. The mouse did not deviate from 
vertical centre of the screen and also could not travel past the response options. This functioned 
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to maintain fidelity of RT data, such that we know that the recorded RT involved only the time it 
took to make the decision plus the time it took for the mouse to travel to the chosen option.  
 Prior to the test trials, participants were given detailed instructions about the task, 
including that the mouse would be slowed on some trials. They were instructed to evaluate the 
conclusions as if the premises were true, regardless of whether they believed the premises to be 
true in the real world. All participants completed two practice trials, on one of which the mouse 
was slowed during the first response. 
Results 
 All data analysis and visualization was completed in the R programming language (R 
Core Team, 2016) with the assistance of add-on packages (see: apa (Gromer, 2017), BayesFactor 
(Morey & Rouder, 2018), dplyr (Wickham, François, Henry, & Müller, 2018), ez (Lawrence, 
2016), lsr (Navarro, 2015), outliers (Komsta, 2011), plyr (Wickham, 2011), stats (R Core Team, 
2017)). All analyses were carried out with an α of .05, and all t-tests were two-tailed. Bayesian 
analyses were carried out using a default prior of √2/2 (Morey & Rouder, 2018). Outliers were 
addressed at the individual and at the group level for all analyses involving response times by 
removing any data points with a Z-score > 3. This resulted in the removal of 51 trials (2.65%).  
Preregistered Analyses1. Before analyzing our key dependent variables, we tested 
whether there were differences in the initiation of response as a function of Condition. There was 
no statistically significant difference in Response Initiation between fast (M = 7.10 s, SD = 1.85 
s) and slow (M = 7.21 s, SD = 2.21 s) trials, t(37) = 0.45, p = .655, d = 0.07, 95% CI of the 
difference [-0.62, 0.39], BF01 = 4.11. This analysis was not preregistered but confirms that 
participants were not responding with different speeds based on the block they were in. Paired-
samples t-tests were conducted to test the effect of the response execution manipulation on FOR 
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and, independently, our measures of reflection (Answer Change and Rethinking Time). There 
was no statistically significant difference in FOR between fast (M = 5.12, SD = 0.82) and slow 
(M = 5.10, SD = 0.96) trials, t(39) = 0.19, p = .853, d = 0.03, 95% CI = [-0.20, 0.24], BF01 = 4.28 
(Figure 1). There was also no statistically significant difference in Answer Change between fast 
(M = 14.59%, SD = 8.73%) and slow (M = 18.86%, SD = 13.67%) trials, t(39) = 1.85, p = .072, d 
= 0.29, 95% CI = [-8.95, 0.40], BF01 = 1.30 (Figure 2). Note that, in the latter case, the Bayesian 
analysis suggests no substantial evidence in favour of either hypothesis, though we have 
marginally more evidence for the null hypothesis than the alternative hypothesis. There was no 
statistically significant difference in Rethinking Time between fast (M = 11.85 s, SD = 6.58 s) 
and slow (M = 11.93 s, SD = 6.43 s) trials, t(38) = 0.09, p = .931, d = 0.01, 95% CI = [-1.93, 
1.77], BF01 = 4.25 (Figure 3). The latter analysis was not preregistered. 
In order to examine how well our data fit with the predictions made by Metacognitive 
Reasoning Theory, average within-subjects correlations were computed between Response 
Initiation and FOR. We decided to correlate FOR and Response Initiation, and not Response 
Time, because slowed trials (i.e., half of trials) have had an approximately three-second delay 
added to every trial, making any correlational analysis using these times difficult to interpret. 
The average within-subjects correlation between Response Initiation and FOR was negative and 
significantly different from zero (-.17), t(39) = 4.06, p < .001, d = 0.64, 95% CI = [-.25, -.08], 
BF10 = 114.16. Similarly, the average within-subjects correlation between FOR and Rethinking 
Time was also negative and significantly different from zero (-.44), t(39) = 15.20, p < .001, d = 
2.40, 95% CI = [-.50, -.38], BF10 = 9.48 x 1014. Trials on which participants changed their 
answer (M = 3.86, SD = 0.83) had a lower mean FOR than did trials on which participants did 
not change their answer (M = 5.35, SD = 0.82), t(39) = 12.69, p < .001, d = 2.01, 95% CI [-1.72, 
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-1.25], BF10 = 7.94 x 108. Trials on which answers changed (M = 20.06 s, SD = 9.75 s) also had a 
greater mean Rethinking Time than did trials where answers did not change (M = 11.37 s, SD = 
7.36 s), t(39) = 8.25, p < .001, d = 1.30, 95% CI [6.56, 10.83], BF10 = 810.99. 
 
Figure 1. FOR as a function of condition. Points indicate individual participant means. 



















Figure 2. Answer Change as a function of condition. Points indicate individual participant 
means. Horizontal lines indicate the group mean. 
 
 
Figure 3. Rethinking Time as a function of condition. Points indicate individual participant 
means. Horizontal lines indicate the group mean. 
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 Exploratory Analyses. Given our response execution manipulation was blocked and 
counterbalanced, we analyzed whether our measures of reflection differed across blocks. We 
found that participants’ Rethinking Time was lower in Block 2 (M = 10.04 s, SD = 6.06 s) than 
in Block 1 (M = 13.74 s, SD = 6.39 s), t(38) = 5.35, p < .001, d = 0.86, 95% CI [2.30, 5.10], BF10 
= 4,225. Additionally, participants were less likely to change their answer in Block 2 (M = 
13.09%, SD = 11.55%) than in Block 1 (M = 20.36%, SD = 10.58%), t(39) = 3.44, p = .001, d = 
0.54, 95% CI [3.00, 11.54], BF10 = 15.87. Correspondingly, mean FORs were higher in Block 2 
(M = 5.24, SD = 0.97) than in Block 1 (M = 4.98, SD = 0.79), t(39) = 2.52, p = .016, d = 0.40, 
95% CI [-0.46, -0.05], BF10 = 2.74. There were no effects of the order in which the blocks were 
seen on FORs (MFS = 5.09, SDFS = 0.81; MSF = 5.12, SDSF = 0.85), t(38) = 0.09, p = .928, d = 
0.03, 95% CI [-0.51, 0.56], BF01 = 3.27, Answer Change (MFS = 15.74%, SDFS = 9.14%; MSF = 
17.82%, SDSF = 8.56%), t(38) = 0.74, p = .461, d = 0.24, 95% CI [-3.58, 7.75], BF01 = 2.60, nor 
Rethinking Time, (MFS = 10.95 s, SDFS = 5.81 s, MSF = 14.34 s, SDSF = 8.59 s), t(38) = 1.46, p = 
.151, d = 0.46, 95% CI [-1.30, 8.08], BF01 = 1.40. 
Participants were more accurate when the mouse was not slowed (M = 62.7%, SD = 
12.5%) than when it was slowed (M = 56.7%, SD = 17.0%) during the initial response, t(39) = 
2.34, p = .024, d = 0.37, 95% CI [0.83, 11.22], BF01 = 1.06, but note that the Bayesian analysis is 
inconclusive. There was no difference in accuracy for the second response between fast (M = 
63.1%, SD = 13.0%) and slow (M = 60.76%, SD = 16.34%) trials, t(39) = 1.10, p = .278, d = 
0.17, 95% CI [-1.95, 6.61], BF01 = 3.47. As a robustness check, we analyzed our data in a similar 
manner to past investigations regarding syllogistic reasoning. We were specifically interested in 
the effects of all the characteristics of our syllogisms (Type, Validity, Premise Believability, and 
Conclusion Believability) on FORs and the effects of some of them (Premise and Conclusion 
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Believability) on endorsement rates and whether these effects interacted with our manipulation. 
Due to the limited number of observations per cell when all of these characteristics are included, 
we decided to conduct individual ANOVAs with each characteristic and Condition as 
independent variables. Any three-way interactions were thus not tested, as they would likely 
have too few observations per cell to be reliable. Participants’ FORs were greater after a correct 
response than an incorrect response, F(1, 39) = 9.97, p = .003, 𝜂"#  = .02, BF10 = 4.85, and when 
the syllogism was valid as opposed to when it was invalid, F(1, 39) = 19.19, p < .001, 𝜂"#  = .03, 
BF10 = 3,159. They were also more confident for categorical as opposed to conditional 
syllogisms, F(1, 39) = 9.71, p = .003, 𝜂"#  = .02, BF10 = 14.52. FORs were greater when the 
premises of the syllogism were believable, F(1, 39) = 9.33, p = .004, 𝜂"#  = .01, BF10 = 5.12, but 
not when the conclusions were believable, F(1, 39) = 1.37, p = .249, 𝜂"#  < .01, BF01 = 5.22. There 
was a statistically significant Premise Believability by Conclusion Believability interaction, F(1, 
39) = 20.95, p < .001, 𝜂"#  = .02, BF10 = 176.44, such that the effect on FOR was largest when 
both the premises and conclusions were believable. None of the characteristics of the syllogisms 
interacted with our manipulation, all Fs ≤ 1.36. In terms of endorsement rates (i.e., participants’ 
likelihood of responding ‘valid’), participants were more likely to endorse as valid syllogisms 
that had believable premises, F(1, 39) = 6.54, p = .015, 𝜂"#  = .02, BF10 = 1.29, or believable 
conclusions, F(1, 39) = 57.76, p < .001, 𝜂"#  = .19, BF10 = 1.73 x 1015, and there was a statistically 
significant Premise Believability by Conclusion Believability interaction, F(1, 39) = 18.85, p < 
.001, 𝜂"#  = .05, BF10 = 348.73, such that the effect of believability was stronger when both 





 The response execution manipulation had no effect on participants’ FOR judgments, nor 
did it have any effect on either of the measures of reflection. Though there was a marginally 
significant effect on Answer Change, examination of Figure 2 confirms that this effect is driven 
by a small number of participants, outside of which there is, reasonably clearly, no effect. These 
results suggest that participants are not using the total duration of their response from which to 
infer a sense of the difficulty of the task nor the likelihood they are correct. More specifically, it 
appears as if Answer Fluency, as opposed to some feeling of fluency derived from the totality of 
a response, produces participants’ FORs. Additionally, our data support the claims made by 
Thompson and colleagues (2011) that FOR guides reflection (on the basis of the negative 
correlation between FOR and Rethinking Time) and that FOR itself is determined by answer 
fluency (on the basis of the negative correlation between Response Initiation and FOR).  
It is worth noting that in Experiment 1 we observed significant block effects suggesting, 
over the course of the experiment, our participants were spending considerably less time on task. 
Participants reflected less, were quicker to respond in the second block, and had increased FORs, 
regardless of which order the blocks were presented. These time-on-task effects are ostensibly 
consistent with MRT; over time, perhaps because the task becomes more familiar, participants 
report increased FORs, and these increased FORs are accompanied by a decrease in reflection. 
That there was no effect of order counterbalance on any of our key DVs suggests that the effects 
of experiment fatigue likely average out across counterbalances, but it is nevertheless possible 
that participants’ altered psychological state, as evidenced by a change in performance from the 
first half of the experiment to the second, affected their experience of ease in the task so as to 
suppress a real and meaningful effect of our manipulation. 
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Experiment 2 
 In Experiment 2, we altered our experimental procedure so that the response execution 
manipulation was randomly intermixed, as opposed to blocked and counterbalanced. As such, 
participants did not know whether the mouse would be slowed on each individual trial until they 
began their initial response by moving the mouse from the centre of the screen. 
Method 
 Participants. Forty undergraduate students from the University of Waterloo participated 
in exchange for partial course credit. The sample size was arrived at in an identical fashion as in 
Experiment 1 and allowed us 80% power to detect an effect of d = .45 with a two-tailed, paired-
samples t-test. 
 Design. The experimental design was identical to that of Experiment 1. 
 Procedure. The procedure was exactly the same as in Experiment 1, with the exception 
that the response execution manipulation (i.e., the slowing of the mouse) was randomly 
intermixed within each subject at the trial level, rather than blocked and counterbalanced as in 
Experiment 1. 
Results 
 Preregistered Analyses2. Forty-one trials (2.14%) were removed as outliers using the 
same criteria as in Experiment 1. There was, once again, no difference in Response Initiation 
Time between fast (M = 8.78 s, SD = 3.24 s) and slow (M = 8.61 s, SD = 3.10 s) trials, t(39) = 
0.78, p = .438, d = 0.12, 95% CI [-0.27, 0.61], BF01 = 4.20. Paired-samples t-tests were once 
again conducted to test the effect of the response execution manipulation on FOR and our 
measures of reflection. There was no statistically significant difference in FOR between fast (M 
= 4.57, SD = 0.78) and slow (M = 4.48, SD = 0.89) trials, t(38) = 1.24, p = .222, d = 0.20, 95% 
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CI [-0.06, 0.25], BF01 = 3.83 (Figure 4). There was also no statistically significant difference in 
Answer Change between fast (M = 17.78%, SD = 10.74%) and slow (M = 16.85%, SD = 
11.61%) trials, t(38) = 0.50, p = .621, d = 0.08, 95% CI [-2.83, 4.67], BF01 = 4.02 (Figure 5), nor 
in Rethinking Time between fast (M = 13.28 s, SD = 6.40 s) and slow (M = 13.01 s, SD = 6.40 s) 
trials, t(39) = 0.83, p = .411, d = 0.13, 95% CI [-0.38, 0.90], BF01 = 4.24 (Figure 6). The 
comparison of Rethinking Time was not preregistered. 
Figure 4. FOR as a function of condition. Points indicate individual participant means. 













Figure 5. Answer Change as a function of condition. Points indicate individual participant 
means. Horizontal lines indicate the group mean. 
 
Figure 6. Rethinking Time as a function of condition. Points indicate individual participant 
means. Horizontal lines indicate the group mean. 
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Once again, average within-subjects correlations were computed between Response 
Initiation and FOR. The average within-subjects correlation between Response Initiation and 
FOR was negative and significantly different from zero (-.17), t(39) = 4.63, p < .001, d = 0.73, 
95% CI = [-.25, -.10], BF10 = 555.57. Similarly, the average within-subjects correlation between 
FOR and Rethinking Time was also negative and significantly different from zero (-.42), t(39) = 
13.34, p < .001, d = 2.11, 95% CI = [-.48, -.36], BF10 = 1.50 x 1013. Trials on which participants 
changed their answer (M = 3.36, SD = 0.97) had a lower mean FOR than did trials on which 
participants did not change their answer (M = 4.64, SD = 0.85), t(38) = 9.69, p < .001, d = 1.55, 
95% CI [-1.55, -1.01], BF10 = 1.37 x 1012. Trials on which answers changed (M = 18.80 s, SD = 
7.81 s) also had a greater mean Rethinking Time than did trials where answers did not change (M 
= 12.21 s, SD = 6.00 s), t(38) = 10.61, p < .001, d = 1.70, 95% CI [5.33, 7.85], BF10 = 278.01.  
Exploratory Analyses. To mirror the block analysis from Experiment 1, we analyzed 
differences in FOR, Rethinking Time, and Answer Change between the first half of trials and the 
second half of trials. There was no statistically significant difference in FOR between the first 
half of trials (M = 4.52, SD = 0.77) and the second half (M = 4.53, SD = 0.93), t(38) = 0.07, p = 
.945, d = 0.01, 95% CI [-0.20, 0.19], BF01 = 5.78. There was also no statistically significant 
difference in Answer Change between the first half of trials (M = 18.79%, SD = 11.79%) and the 
second half (M = 15.68%, SD = 12.00%), t(38) = 1.36, p = .182, d = 0.22, 95% CI [-1.52, 7.74], 
BF01 = 2.48, but note that the Bayesian analysis provides no substantial evidence for the null or 
alternative hypothesis. There was, however, a statistically significant difference in Rethinking 
Time between the first half of trials (M = 14.20 s, SD = 7.15 s) and the second half (M = 12.10 s, 
SD = 6.01 s), t(39) = 3.46, p = .001, d = 0.55, 95% CI [0.87, 3.32], BF10 = 23.56. 
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Participants’ accuracy was nearly identical in the Fast (M = 60.44%, SD = 13.40%) and 
Slow (M = 60.98%, SD = 15.31%) conditions for the first response, t(39) = 0.18, p = .857, d = 
0.03, 95% CI [-6.61, 5.52], BF01 = 4.25, and the second response (MF = 63.07%, SDF = 14.24%; 
MS = 63.62%, SDS = 15.17%), t(39) = 0.17, p = .864, d = 0.03, 95% CI [-6.98, 5.89], BF01 = 
4.25. As with Experiment 1, we also analyzed our data in a similar manner to past investigations 
of syllogistic reasoning (i.e., with each characteristic of the syllogisms being analyzed in an 
ANOVA). Participants’ FORs were greater following a correct response than following an 
incorrect response, F(1, 39) = 19.94, p < .001, 𝜂"#  = .03, BF10 = 385.46, and when the syllogism 
was valid as opposed to when it was invalid, F(1, 39) = 32.01, p < .001, 𝜂"#  = .04, BF10 = 
158,527. They were also more confident for categorical as opposed to conditional syllogisms, 
F(1, 39) = 25.23, p < .001, 𝜂"#  = .03, BF10 = 18,126. This was also true when the premises of the 
syllogism were believable, F(1, 39) = 25.23, p < .001, 𝜂"#  = .03, BF10 = 1.27 x 108, and when the 
conclusions were believable, F(1, 39) = 17.22, p < .001, 𝜂"#  = .02, BF10 = 491.75. This time, 
there was no statistically significant Premise Believability by Conclusion Believability 
interaction, F(1, 39) = 2.64, p = .112, 𝜂"#  < .01, BF01 = 4.48. None of the characteristics of the 
syllogisms interacted with our manipulation, all Fs ≤ 1.62. In Experiment 2, participants were no 
more likely to endorse as valid syllogisms that had believable premises, F(1, 39) = 0.56, p = 
.459, 𝜂"#  < .01, BF01 = 21.02, but were more likely to endorse as valid those that had believable 
conclusions, F(1, 39) = 72.54, p < .001, 𝜂"#  = .35, BF10 = 7.02 x 1025, and there was no 
statistically significant Premise Believability by Conclusion Believability interaction, F(1, 39) = 
1.53, p = .223, 𝜂"#  < .01, BF01 = 9.47. 
Finally, we compared all of our dependent variables of interest in Experiment 1 to 
Experiment 2. Though the lack of an effect of our manipulation was clearly constant across 
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experiments, it is possible that participants’ FORs, reflection, or just performance in general 
changes when the manipulation is intermixed as opposed to blocked, and it is possible that these 
changes are informative in and of themselves. There was no difference in accuracy for the first 
response between Experiment 1 (M = 59.74%, SD = 12.45%) and Experiment 2 (M = 60.73%, 
SD = 10.82%), t(78) = 0.38, p = .705, d = 0.08, 95% CI [-6.18, 4.20], BF01 = 4.04, nor was there 
a difference in accuracy for the second response between Experiment 1 (M = 61.94%, SD = 
13.15%) and Experiment 2 (M = 63.38%, SD = 10.72%), t(78) = 0.53, p = .595, d = 0.12, 95% 
CI [-6.78, 3.91], BF01 = 3.80. There was, however, a statistically significant difference in 
Response Initiation Time between Experiment 1 (M = 7.16 s, SD = 1.89 s) and Experiment 2 (M 
= 8.70 s, SD = 3.10 s), t(76) = 2.64, p = .010, d = 0.60, 95% CI [-2.71, -0.38], BF10 = 4.49. There 
was also a statistically significant difference in FOR between Experiment 1 (M = 5.11, SD = 
0.82) and Experiment 2 (M = 4.52, SD = 0.80), t(77) = 3.19, p = .002, d = 0.72, 95% CI [0.22, 
0.95], BF10 = 16.55. There was, however, no statistically significant difference in Answer 
Change between Experiment 1 (M = 16.78%, SD = 8.81%) and Experiment 2 (M = 17.29%, SD 
= 9.55%), t(77) = 0.25, p = .805, d = 0.06, 95% CI [-4.63, 3.60], BF01 = 4.17, nor in Rethinking 
Time (M1 = 11.91 s, SD1 = 5.85 s; M2 = 13.15 s, SD2 = 6.32 s), t(77) = 0.91, p = .367, d = 0.20, 
95% CI [-3.97, 1.49], BF01 = 3.00. 
Discussion 
 In Experiment 2, we replicated the critical patterns of data from Experiment 1. Once 
again, the response execution manipulation had no effect on participants’ FOR judgments, nor 
did it have any effect on either of the measures of reflection. This time, there was a clearer non-
effect of our manipulation on Answer Change. Our results again replicate the key predictions 
made by MRT, specifically that speed of first response is negatively correlated with FORs, that 
 21 
FORs are negatively correlated with Rethinking Time, and that changed answers are associated 
with decreased FORs. In addition to this, our data from both Experiments 1 and 2 generally fall 
in line with extant observations in the syllogistic reasoning literature. The results of Experiments 
1 and 2 suggest that participants, in a two-response task, do not infer FORs from the duration 
with which they are able to complete a response. Importantly, the results of Experiment 2 also 
provide a replication of the results from Experiment 1, one benefit of which is to rule out the 



















 Across two experiments, we manipulated the speed of responding in a two-response 
reasoning task. The purpose of this manipulation was to identify whether processes occurring 
after the mental generation of an answer (but before the physical completion of the response) 
factor into metacognitive feelings about a response, and specifically FORs. It has been 
previously demonstrated (Thompson et al., 2011) that answers that come to mind more easily are 
associated with greater FORs and are subsequently associated with a decreased tendency to 
reflect. Critically, the operationalization of ease of responding here was the speed with which a 
response could be completed. From the Dual-Process perspective, easier Type I outputs are less 
likely to be reflected upon; more difficult Type I outputs prompt reflection. The response 
execution manipulation employed here differentiated two possible accounts: 1) that the relation 
between speed and FORs is due to the ease with which an answer comes to mind, and 2) that this 
relation is based on the totality of each response, including aspects of said response occurring 
after the point when an answer comes to mind. In the present investigation, we found no 
evidence that FORs nor reflection are influenced by a manipulation of response execution. In 
addition, we reproduced the key predictions of MRT; FORs were negatively correlated with both 
Response Time (as approximated here by Response Initiation Time) and Rethinking Time, and 
participants were less likely to change answers when higher FORs were given.  
The results of the present investigation suggest that metacognitions in reasoning are not 
driven by inferences made about the length of time it takes to complete a response to a problem. 
More broadly, the present investigation provides evidence that the relation between speed of 
response and FORs is likely due to the speed with which an answer is generated. That is, events 
occurring after the generation of a response, at least as operationalized here, do not influence 
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FORs. This is consistent with Thompson and colleagues’ (2011) suggestion that answer fluency 
is the critical variable in determining FORs.  
Implications for Fluency Research 
The evidence presented here is based on only one of many possible post-response 
production manipulations. The manipulation used herein impacted only the length of time with 
which a response could be completed. The observed lack of effect of the chosen manipulation 
precludes only a mechanism wherein elapsed time during a response is the critical factor. 
Perhaps a manipulation that makes responses more difficult (and is longer as a by-product of this 
difficulty) reduces FORs. In this vein, the results of the present investigation should not be taken 
as contradictory to those presented by Susser and Mulligan (2015; and Susser et al., 2017), who 
observed decreased JOLs for words written with one’s nondominant hand. Their handedness 
manipulation slowed responding to the presented stimuli but was also inherently more difficult. 
In addition, it is of course possible that the aspects of processing that influence FORs and JOLs 
are different. 
One possible difference between the work presented here and past work is the obvious 
irrelevance of the response execution manipulation. As noted by Alter and Oppenheimer (2009; 
and Oppenheimer, 2004), participants will in some contexts spontaneously discount 
manipulations they perceive as having no relevance to the task at hand. It is therefore possible 
that participants in the present experiments simply discounted the response execution 
manipulation as a source of fluency, ignoring any potential effects of said manipulation when 
responding with their FORs. The manipulation used in the present investigation was designed to 
affect only the time it took to complete a response, and a necessary tradeoff in using a 
manipulation so one-dimensional is a corresponding increase in its obviousness. It is difficult to 
 24 
imagine a manipulation that clearly does not impact the difficulty of the task but hides this fact 
from participants. Additionally, the characteristics of fluency manipulations that make them 
susceptible to spontaneous discounting are ill-defined. Though it is possibly the case that the 
manipulation used herein was discounted by participants, it is difficult to image an alternative 
that accomplishes the same goals but would not be. As such, it is possible that the response 
execution manipulation was simply discounted by participants, but this limitation is seemingly 
necessary for an investigation like the one here. 
Implications for Dual-Process Research 
It has been argued that the driving force behind the relation between speed and FORs is 
that quick responses are experienced as easier. This could be true in one of two ways. One 
possibility is that individuals infer ease from the speed with which they can bring an answer to 
mind. That is, individuals might, upon the production of a response, evaluate the amount of time 
it took to produce said response, and infer ease if the response was produced quickly. 
Alternatively, individuals might simply have access to the ease or difficulty of producing a 
response. In this case, the relation between time to response and FORs would simply be a by-
product of the relation between speed and ease. That is, it would necessarily be true that easier 
responses are produced more quickly. It is worth noting that the present investigation cannot 
differentiate between these competing explanations, as our manipulation occurred necessarily 
after the point where an answer had come to mind. Rather, the above accounts can both equally 
explain the results herein and those of Thompson and colleagues (2011).  
Irrespective of the exact monitoring mechanism, this facet of dual-process decision-
making has important implications. In MRT, the experience of difficulty is an important 
determinant of whether individuals will choose to engage their more reflective, Type II 
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processes, and as such, manipulations that induce feelings of difficulty have the potential to 
increase reflectiveness, and downstream, improve the quality of decisions. The present 
investigation provides evidence suggesting that successful manipulations of the fluency 
experience in reasoning will likely have to operate in the time before the generation of a Type I 
output, as this is likely the point when a feeling of ease or difficulty arises. 
Through exploratory analyses, we found two novel patterns of data that are interesting 
vis-à-vis MRT. First, when the response execution manipulation was blocked, the second block 
was associated with increased FORs and decreased reflection, consistent with the predictions of 
MRT. However, when the manipulation was intermixed, there was no difference in FORs 
between the first half of trials and the second, but there was decreased reflection for at least one 
of our measures of reflection (Rethinking Time; Bayesian analyses were unable to conclusively 
rule out an effect on Answer Change). Second, (arguably) by virtue of intermixing the response 
execution manipulation in Experiment 2, FORs decreased without any effect on either measure 
of reflection. That is, participants felt less right on average, but without a commensurate increase 
in reflection (though the means were higher in the intermixed condition). These results provide 
evidence that the nature of metacognitive experience can potentially change both over time and 
with the nature of the manipulation (i.e., whether it is mixed or blocked). Additionally, the 
predicted relations between FORs and reflection are, in the data presented here, inconsistent 
when looking at aggregate changes; an aggregate change in FOR is not necessarily predictive of 
an opposite aggregate change in reflection. Put another way, while maintaining the individual 
correlations between FORs and reflection, MRT seems not to capture aggregate changes. 
Although Thompson and colleagues primarily conceptualize MRT within an individual’s 
metacognitive experiences (i.e., trials on which that individual experiences ease will be met with 
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relatively little reflection for that individual), it is perhaps more accurate to conceptualize MRT 
at only the individual level. This is consistent with the view that the crucial feature of the 
experience of ease is that it changes relative to past experience (Hansen & Wänke, 2013; Wänke 
& Hansen, 2015). That is, fluency is a relative more so than an absolute phenomenon; ease 
relative to expectations or recent past states influences metacognitive judgments. In this case, 
FORs are likely a product of experienced ease relative to previously experienced ease, and thus 
should probably be held to be predictive of reflection at the trial level, and not be expected, when 
subject to aggregate changes, to produce aggregate changes in reflection. This insight might have 
important implications for attempts to use introduced disfluencies as a means to increase 
reflection. 
Conclusion  
The present investigation represents a first, basic step toward understanding the specific 
fluency mechanisms behind the operation of metacognitive processes within a MRT framework. 
Future research can further investigate the metacognitive mechanisms within Dual-Process 
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